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ratories in which animals are treated inhumanely. The patient work in the moral 
philosophy of biology this book exemplifies—fortunately, many other philoso­
phers are making the same kind of effort—“may seem excessively incremental 
or moderate to some people,” Jamieson concedes (340). If moral progress is 
indeed possible, however, a book of this kind shows how.
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Recent questions raised in the arena of liberal domestic justice have become a 
major focus of controversy in response to current interest in the international 
dimension of the debates. While there are various approaches and ways of fram­
ing the issues of international justice, ranging in scope from global egalitarianism 
to extended nationalism and limited globalism, they all underscore the need 
for effective political and institutional directives that would adequately respond 
to the challenges of the new global order. Andrew Kuper’s book is a bold and 
innovative study of this new prospect.
Kuper argues that global governance should be restructured to make it 
more accountable to public interests and more responsive to human needs. 
Toward that end, he suggests a reconfiguration of international institutions and 
an “unbundling” of national sovereignty under the broad rubric of what he 
terms “responsive democracy.” The idea calls for a cosmopolitan vision ofjustice 
that questions the statist notion of Rawlsian international justice. Contra Rawls, 
Kuper extends to the global discourse the liberal ideal of individuals as free and 
equal and claims that his institutional cosmopolitanism responds better to the 
challenges of pluralism in a divided world than Rawls’s law of peoples. Kuper 
also argues that the kind of institutional innovation that his theory of responsive 
democracy envisions better accommodates individual representation in gover­
nance than Habermas’s influential model of deliberative democracy.
All this is a tall order, and Kuper himself acknowledges the fact. This is 
both an asset and a drawback of the book—its encapsulated and focused form 
offers an innovative trajectory toward an institutional rearrangement in the 
global order that would be democratically responsive, but its drawback is that 
the theoretical nuances of his seemingly promising ideas are essentially undev­
eloped. Nonetheless, Kuper’s ideas of democratic representation have vast im­
plications for international law, global justice, and human rights.
Given the steady erosion of state sovereignty in today’s globalized world 
and the pervasive state failure to respond to its citizens’ needs, Kuper argues 
that both liberalism and democracy—the two most viable norms for political 
legitimacy—need to be wrested out of the sole jurisdiction of states and made 
workable in a nonstatist framework. This is the basis of his “moral cosmopoli­
tanism”—a blend of both the normative concern for equality and the practical
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need for efficiency—that constitutes his account of political legitimacy modeled 
after liberal democracy extended to global governance. It demands a dispersion 
of sovereignty across territorial units and nonterritorially based agencies, span­
ning local, regional, and global institutions. Thus, sovereignty is functionally 
dispersed both for the sake of fair political representation and to accommodate 
the increasingly critical global reality of overlapping jurisdictions of participa­
tion.
In view of the standard critique of cosmopolitanism—that it is unrealistic 
and utopian in a world lacking a plausible mechanism of international enforce­
ment—Kuper’s reminder of the functionally differentiated global scheme helps 
to make his cosmopolitanism look more credible. Given the global nature of 
today’s politics, commerce, and institutions and the many existing measures in 
the current international system that are designed to enforce order and human 
rights—Kuper cites many of them—it is prudent to take seriously the cosmo­
politan implications of political legitimacy.
But to Kuper’s credit, he doesn’t let the practical or the prudential trump 
the ideal, for he rightly notes that to compromise the ideal theory for the sake 
of the status quo is to give in to a modus vivendi which is far from global justice. 
His account of political legitimacy has the liberal idealistic bent whereby indi­
viduals, not the Rawlsian peoples, are the “normative epicenters” of globaljustice 
(45). But this idealism is reinforced—not toned down—by the practical efficacy 
of multiple levels of territorially nested jurisdictions (“plurarchy,” as Kuper calls 
this structure). Accordingly, he thinks that Rawls, by compromising his earlier 
liberal egalitarianism in favor of an undue deference to cultural pluralism in 
his law of peoples, loses out on both counts, being neither sufficiently utopian 
nor appropriately practical.
This approach toward a theory of globaljustice seems to minimize the gap 
between the normative ideal and the political reality so endemic in abstract 
cosmopolitanism, although the gap still exists. But this is not only inevitable in 
a normative discourse; it is in another sense desirable. As important as it is to 
make vivid the need for a realistic assessment of moral pronouncements, it is 
also necessary to emphasize the importance of moral imperatives in world affairs. 
Normative claims of justice and fairness have an important role not only in 
setting the ideal but in practice as well.
For instance, although international relations are usually guided by power 
and self-interest, the concept of fairness is invariably brought in when there is 
a dispute. This is evident in international trade agreements, environmental pol­
icies, and other mutually agreed-upon treaties and in military ventures as well. 
Although hegemonic interests may often be couched under the pretense of 
moral imperatives in so-called humanitarian military interventions, it is the nor­
mative ideal, usually under the broad rubric of a just-war doctrine, that gives 
military ventures their legitimacy. Kuper himself discusses humanitarian inter­
vention as an illustration of the practical application of ideals whereby less drastic 
means than force may prove to be more efficacious—based on the normative 
ends of his moral cosmopolitanism.
Accordingly, to distill ideal theory of its normative imperative for ready 
strategies of enforcement is to misunderstand the role of the ideal in practice. 
Besides, such strategies do not necessarily have a better leverage for implemen­
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tation in the real world than the normative approach. The crucial issue seems 
to hinge on the task of showing how the ideal theory can be conceptualized 
within an institutional and political setting so that it is workable as a guiding 
moral principle. To do this, one need not compromise or tone down the ideal 
theory but should show how it can be blended with nonideal theory.
Kuper seems to be mindful of all this as he lays down his strategy for devising 
a viable “global institutional configuration” based on his cosmopolitan ideals of 
justice and legitimacy (45). What is missing from his discussion is a nuanced 
and well-developed articulation—sufficiently rich in conceptual details—of the 
ideal theory itself and how it blends with nonideal theory with respect to his 
key concepts of cosmopolitan justice, democratic representation, sovereignty, 
and conflicting rights of groups and individuals, to name just a few.
For instance, Kuper develops his theory of cosmopolitan justice as a critique 
of Rawls’s law of peoples, which may be a good start, but he needs to give the 
reader the conceptual details of the positive thesis of his theory, which he doesn’t. 
Kuper’s cosmopolitan “law of persons,” as he calls it, is very sketchy as a theory, 
although it holds much promise. The law of persons may be reasonably free 
from some of the drawbacks of the law of peoples, but it may have its own 
limitations that Kuper doesn’t spell out. Theories of global justice with individ­
uals as the basic units of justice have been proposed and critiqued in recent 
times. Kuper’s readers would have benefited had he engaged in more detail any 
questions regarding the other theories’ merits and demerits and how his own 
theory might compare with them.
Even with his critique of Rawls, there’s room for doubt. Kuper asserts that 
Rawls’s law of peoples is not sufficiently practical because it is an idealized theory 
that has hypothetical ideas of inclusion but no real-life institutional guidelines 
for political representation at the individual level. Others have argued, on the 
contrary, that Rawls’s emphasis on the practice of public discourse among agents 
with diverse perspectives and his narrow construal of human rights in interna­
tional justification and criticism of governments’ conduct can be the basis for 
an effective practical-political account of rights and international justice. This 
they prefer over the foundational ideals of rights, prevalent among philosophers 
but which prevail nowhere. Sympathy to this broadly Rawlsian methodology is 
not entirely unfounded. If Kuper would call the Rawlsian turn to the global 
issues a poster case to “eternalize the violation of right,” following Kant (“Per­
petual Peace,” in Kant’s Political Writings, trans. and ed. Hans Reiss [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991], 119-25), then it would seem he is unduly 
dismissive of an entire genre of literature in political theory that finds Rawls 
broadly useful. Kuper may well be right, but he would have a more convincing 
case if he were to engage in more theoretical detail with the sympathizers of 
Rawls.
Similarly, in critiquing Habermas, Kuper is too dismissive of the entire 
project of deliberative democracy. For Kuper, construing deliberation as an egal­
itarian forum for representation doesn’t work because it is based on an idealized 
view of reality that fails to take note of the asymmetry of power and knowledge. 
What Kuper does not take note of is that, not unlike him, a new genre of scholars 
addresses the issue of egalitarian representation in a pluralistic world, but it 
does so through the lens of deliberative democracy that includes a critique of
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some dominant approaches to deliberative democracy (again, not unlike the 
one that Kuper offers of Habermas). But primarily, these scholars take liberalism 
to task by showing the limitations of what they call the a priori liberal approaches 
to the problem. They argue that the issue of democratic representation in a 
pluralistic world is essentially a political one, requiring a strategic response, not 
a liberal normative resolution because the conflict, regardless of its appearance, 
is not a clash of liberalism versus illiberalism. For them, an a priori normative 
framing at the foundational level tilts the discourse in favor of liberalism, re­
sulting in the marginalization and alienation of minority groups (and individ­
uals) that differ from the mainstream liberal ideology. So they offer a resolution 
to the liberal dilemma of respecting individual rights and cultural pluralism by 
reframing the conflict through the lens of deliberative democracy.
Some rights-based liberals also have done promising work to find a middle 
ground between abstract egalitarian universalism and cultural specificity to val­
idate the “situatedness” of the normative ideal of the liberal human rights en­
terprise within a democratic setting. Appealing to realities of current global 
practice, they emphasize the actual vitality of cross-cultural discourse concerning 
human rights and the heterogeneity of religious and cultural communities that 
tend to be treated as uniformly committed to restrictive views. This is a direction 
where abstract liberalism committed to universal egalitarianism becomes situated 
and negotiable by adopting some version of deliberative democracy.
Instead of being so dismissive of deliberative democracy based on a critique 
of Habermas, Kuper should have been open to some of the more promising 
ramifications of the theory that are coming out in recent literature. His ideas 
of responsive democracy may still prevail over the rival ideas, but a detailed 
engagement with alternative challenges would have made his position more 
credible.
A similar lack of nuanced details is evident with respect to his other key 
ideas. Kuper suggests several concrete institutional reforms as well as the granting 
of limited sovereignty over a network of intergovernmental and nongovern­
mental organizations specific to their missions, resulting in an overhauling of 
global governance and unbundling of national sovereignty. All this has vast 
implications for international law, but although Kuper displays a judicious un­
derstanding of the way global institutions and organizations operate, he doesn’t 
get into the details about whether all these reforms are feasible and sustainable 
within the framework of international law.
The lack of an international legal paradigm in the face of rapid interna­
tionalism makes vivid the problem of global governance. That, in turn, is prob­
lematic for the prospect for a viable theory of global justice and democratic 
global governance. International law is not yet equipped to respond adequately 
to the demands of cosmopolitan justice, just as it has yet to work out the moral 
and legal implications of the new and fluid dynamics of sovereignty. Positivism 
and state sovereignty still being the operating norms in international law, the 
challenge to work out the moral foundations for a legal framework for governing 
the newly emerging international society rests not only in suggesting specific 
institutional reforms but, more fundamentally, on reconceiving the cosmopol­
itan reach of international law.
Kuper’s decision not to focus on this aspect of international law makes his
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otherwise innovative and bold study a bit one-sided. Also, some of his important 
assertions seem sketchy in regard to alternative theories (based on a selective 
focus on a few prominent instances) and due to the lack of details about his 
own positive theses. Nonetheless, his book is an important contribution to the 
pressing project of construing a realistic normative theory for an equitable global 
governance.
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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) is, and has been considered, for, say, the past 
few decades, to be one of, if not the most, influential of ethical treatises from 
the past for current research in moral philosophy. Yet it is one of the most 
disputed works in the whole history of ethics. And the controversy is not on 
details but on key issues such as akrasia, the role and status of phronesis, the role 
of emotions, and so on. And, as if that weren’t paradoxical enough, perhaps 
the most vividly disputed question is on the very central and leading theme of 
this whole eudaemonistic enterprise: what is eudaemonia?
As is well known, the interpretative terrain is quite clearly divided into two 
camps. The first kind of interpretation, labeled ‘inclusive’, sees happiness as a 
whole whose parts, which are the intellectual as well as the ethical “virtues” or 
“excellences,” are constituents; a person lacking, say, courage, wouldn’t be con­
sidered to be living a happy life. The second kind of interpretation, labeled 
‘dominant’ or ‘monistic’ (or ‘exclusive’, but that term is probably too strong), 
considers happiness as mainly, or “dominantly,” a life of “contemplation” 
(theoria), the other virtues or excellences, including phronesis, which is practical 
wisdom, being either tools for contemplation or, in one way or another, depen­
dent on contemplation. That is the interpretative camp Gabriel Richardson Lear 
aims to defend.
Let’s say it from the beginning: together with Richard Kraut’s important 
book (Aristotle on the Human Good [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1989]), this book is the most extensive and powerful defense of a “dominant” 
reading; Lear’s fresh and new ways of reading well-known, and puzzling, passages 
from NE offer no less than a new way of understanding NE as a whole, and she 
manages to provide very consistent answers to most of the difficulties and puzzles 
interpreters have been trying to solve during the past four decades of a very 
crowded literature (since Hardie’s article, where the labels ‘inclusive’ and ‘dom­
inant’ appeared). Yet, putting my cards on the table, since I think (like many 
others and, perhaps, the majority of Aristotelians, and more generally, scholars 
of ancient philosophy) that an “inclusive” reading is after all the better camp, 
I suggest providing a very rough summary of her main arguments, before trying 
to reply to some of them.
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